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Who wants what from the welfare state?
Abstract
This article investigates socio-structural cleavages in relation to social policies in Switzerland. It
examines the extent to which vertical stratification, age and gender explain variation in individual social
policy preferences. We use survey data on reported voting behaviour in 22 direct democratic
referendums on distributional issues between 1981 and 2004. Our two main findings are the following:
1) age seems to be the most relevant line of conflict in most distributional issues; 2) vertical
stratification (income and education) and gender are less important in explaining individual voting
decisions. Our data also suggest that material interests based on socio-structural characteristics account
for only part of the variation in social policy preferences, and that value cleavages are also important.
 1 
Forthcoming in European Societies 
 
 
 
 
Who wants what from the welfare state?  
Socio-structural cleavages in distributional politics: 
Evidence from Swiss referendum votes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First author:      Second author:  
Giuliano Bonoli     Silja Häusermann 
Swiss graduate school of    Political Science Department 
public administration (IDHEAP)   University of Zurich 
Rte de la Maladière 21   Seilergraben 53 
1022 Chavannes-près-Renens  8001 Zurich 
Switzerland     Switzerland 
giuliano.bonoli@idheap.unil.ch  silja.haeusermann@ipz.uzh.ch 
Tel: +41 21 557 40 90   Tel: +41 44 634 40 13 
Fax: +41 21 557 40 09   Fax: +41 44 634 43 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
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Abstract 
This article investigates socio-structural cleavages in relation to social policies in 
Switzerland. It examines the extent to which vertical stratification, age and gender 
explain variation in individual social policy preferences. We use survey data on 
reported voting behaviour in 22 direct democratic referendums on distributional issues 
between 1981 and 2004. Our two main findings are the following: 1) age seems to be 
the most relevant line of conflict in most distributional issues; 2) vertical stratification 
(income and education) and gender are less important in explaining individual voting 
decisions. Our data also suggest that material interests based on socio-structural 
characteristics account for only part of the variation in social policy preferences, and 
that value cleavages are also important. 
 
Keywords 
Welfare states, social policy preferences, generational cleavage, class cleavage, 
Switzerland 
 3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Research on individual social policy preferences has highlighted a number of socio-
structural cleavages as determinants. Studies investigating public opinion on the 
various redistributive schemes that make up today’s welfare states have shown the 
relevance of class-related factors such as income or education as key explanatory 
variables (Ferrera 1993, Taylor-Gooby 1995; 1998; Svallfors 1997). More recent 
studies, however, have suggested that other factors are also likely to play a role. 
Among these, the most important are age, gender, and individual values (Armingeon 
2006; Deitch 2004; Roller 2000, 2002). The scenario that emerges from the existing 
literature is one of multiple intersecting cleavages, but it remains unclear what today 
is the relative weight and specific impact of each of these cleavages. 
 
In addition, studies on policy preferences with regard to distributional issues suffer 
from a key weakness: they rely on survey data. Individual responses to questions 
asked in public opinion surveys are problematic for several reasons (Gaxie 1990; 
Kangas 1995; Berclaz 2002). Respondents may not be familiar with the subject of the 
survey or may not have an opinion on the question asked. Questions tend to be rather 
general, whereas people hold specific opinions on particular policies. In addition, 
researchers have pointed out the existence of a pro-altruism bias, or a tendency to 
reply in a “politically correct” manner (Taylor-Gooby 1998). 
 
Against this background, our objective is to examine the structure of social policy 
preferences on the basis of reported voting behaviour in direct democratic 
referendums on social policy reforms. Switzerland has a strong tradition of 
referendums since 18481. The paper analyses voting patterns in 22 referendums on 
distributional issues that took place between 1981 and 2004. These include a variety 
of proposals going from lowering the age of retirement to cutting unemployment 
benefits or introducing a brand new maternity insurance scheme. Using multivariate 
logistic regression analysis, we assess the relative importance of the various putative 
cleavages.  
 
Data on reported voting behaviour is not unproblematic, either. Turnout is socially 
structured: non-nationals (about 20% of the Swiss population) are barred from voting 
and, as in other democracies, participation is related to age and education levels. We 
have tested empirically for this possible bias where possible. However, this new 
referendum-data does have a particular value: voting behaviour reflects actual 
decisions, often informed by public debates. It can be seen as a rather solid indicator 
of what people want from the welfare state. Therefore, data on reported voting 
behaviour can usefully complement our knowledge in this field.  
 
An additional caveat concerns the country, where the referendums have taken place. 
Switzerland is rather unique among western democracies in several respects: 
consensus-democratic political institutions have forged a tradition of consensual 
policy-making. In addition, in international comparison, the overall level of material 
wellbeing has been high throughout the 20th century. One might think that economic 
affluence may weaken the salience of the economic (class) conflict in comparison 
with other countries, and thereby affect our results. However, social stratification on 
income and education is even higher in Switzerland than in most continental 
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European countries, and party-positions on economic welfare issues are as polarized 
as in the neighbouring countries (Bornschier 2007). Hence, the distribution of 
preferences in Switzerland should not be completely idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, 
given the particular consensus-democratic institutional framework, our findings may 
not necessarily apply to other democracies.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework: conflict lines in social policy making 
Social policy preferences may be structured by a number of cleavages. For the sake of 
conceptual clarity and in response to data limitation problems, we focus our 
investigation on a set of hypotheses based on a simple utility-maximising reasoning. 
In other words, we expect social groups to support policies that bring them 
advantages, and to oppose those, which bring them material costs. In so doing, we do 
not claim that differences in values and norms are irrelevant for people’s preferences. 
On the contrary, as will be seen below, we even interpret the inability of utility-
maximisation based hypotheses to account for some of our findings as an indication 
that values matter. However, questions on personal values have been asked only in the 
latest post-referendum surveys, so that with our data we cannot deal directly with the 
issue of the impact of values. Hence, the focus of this article is clear: how far can we 
go in explaining individual social policy preferences with a simple utility-
maximization assumption?  
 
On the basis of existing scholarship we identify three crucial cleavages supposed to 
shape social policy preferences: vertical stratification, age and gender.  
 
 
2.1. Vertical stratification as the main cleavage in social policy making 
Traditionally, redistributive social policies have widely been understood as the result 
of the mobilisation of economically disadvantaged groups. In most cases, these groups 
could be equated with the working class (Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; Esping-
Andersen 1985). In addition, as pointed out by Peter Baldwin, other disadvantaged 
groups, such as farmers in the Nordic countries, have occasionally joined forces with 
industrial workers (Baldwin 1990). Overall, the hypothesis implied by this strand of 
literature is that on most distributional issues, the main cleavage line will be vertical 
stratification based on material resources. Quite simply, lower income groups are 
expected to be more supportive of redistributive measures, because they are those who 
can expect to gain most.  
 
Subsequent research, however, has questioned the unique role of vertical stratification 
in structuring welfare state conflicts. With regard to the Nordic welfare states, some 
authors argue that welfare states are also the result of an alliance between the middle 
and the lower classes and of class compromise (Baldwin 1990, Swenson 2002, Palier 
2003). Finally, authors such as van Kersbergen (1995) and Manow (2002) have 
insisted on religious actors as drivers of reform and main allies of the working class.  
 
This literature shows that welfare states are not simply the result of vertically 
structured class conflict. Nevertheless, all these authors do emphasize the role of the 
materially most disadvantaged groups as a consistently pro-welfare force in industrial 
welfare states. For the purpose of this paper, we thus include income and educational 
stratification as socio-structural determinants in the analysis, and we expect people in 
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social strata that are less endowed with those resources to be more supportive of 
redistributive measures than people in higher strata.  
 
2.2. A generational conflict over resource allocation?  
The debate on a generational conflict over the allocation of resources has made its 
appearance in the 1980s, first in the US. According to some commentators, the pro-
elderly bias of the welfare state, coupled with population ageing, will result in 
increasingly large transfers from the working age to the retired population. The pro-
elderly bias is probably the unintended result of welfare state design choices made 
several decades ago (Lynch 2006). However, in the ongoing era of welfare state 
restructuring, the age bias of social policy reinforces the stakes that older age groups 
have in the welfare state. Assuming an interest-led rational voting behaviour, older 
voters should be particularly inclined to preserve the high level of social entitlements 
achieved during the postwar years (Longman 1987; Thurow 1996).  
 
More systematic research carried out in subsequent years has provided substantial 
evidence that the generational divide increasingly constitutes a cleavage over the 
allocation of resources. Pampel, for instance, found that the pro-aged bias in social 
policies depended very much on the interest representation system of different 
countries: in the US, issue-based representation encourages fragmentation including 
along generational lines (Pampel 1994). Poterba, studying spending on education in 
the US over the 1960-1990 period, found that increases in the proportion of the older 
population are a significant determinant of reductions in per-child educational 
spending (Poterba 1997). Hence, empirical studies increasingly confirm the thesis of 
generational competition in the allocation of public sector resources. 
 
Finally, public opinion research on social policy preferences is also of relevance. 
Here, the age variable seems to play an important role. In general, older respondents 
favour more spending on programmes like pensions and health care, but less on 
education or unemployment benefit (Armingeon 2006; Esping-Andersen 1999; Roller 
2002). The cleavage seems to be somewhat asymmetric, though: older people are less 
supportive of policies for the young, while the younger generations tend to be equally 
supportive of all policies. This can be explained with a simple interest-based 
hypothesis, making reference to the likelihood to be one day beneficiary of the 
relevant programme. There is little longitudinal research on these issues, but one 
study on Germany shows that an age cleavage in policy preferences over income 
guarantee programmes has emerged over the last few decades (Roller 2002). 
 
Assuming an interest based behaviour we can expect age groups to favour policies 
that benefit them. In addition, we can also expect an age cleavage to emerge more 
clearly in polices for the young, such as family policy or education, than in those 
benefiting older voters.  
 
2.3. Gender as a cleavage line in distributional issues? 
The study of gender-based divisions in attitudes towards welfare states is less 
developed than the study of age or economic cleavages. Political scientists have paid 
more attention to gender as a determinant of electoral behaviour, and have identified a 
gender gap: in a majority of advanced democracies women are today more likely to be 
left voters than men (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), 
whereas they were more likely to be on the right during the postwar years.  
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Women’s inclination to prefer left-wing parties is reflected in analyses of social 
policy preferences. Public opinion researchers have found a small but consistent 
gender gap in attitudes towards welfare state support in all western countries, with 
women being more supportive of social policies (Armingeon 2006; Deitch 2004; 
Svalffors 1997). The effect is weakened if one controls for class, party and union 
membership, but does not disappear. But how can we account theoretically for the 
gender gap in both voting behaviour and social policy preferences?  
 
First, some authors have argued that socialization resulting from women’s typical 
biography as primary care givers results in higher levels of compassion, which is 
supposed to be associated with left-wing party support (Deitch 2004). This view, 
however, is incompatible with the change of direction in the gender gap. When 
women were more likely to be primary carers (the postwar years) they tended to be 
more conservative. In addition, women who are full time carers are presently less 
likely to be on the left than those who are involved in paid employment (Iversen and 
Rosenbluth 2006).  
 
A second perspective puts more emphasis on a shift in women’s material interests 
over the last thirty to forty years. According to this view, women have shifted their 
social policy preferences in parallel with their increased propensity to engage in paid 
employment. Women wishing to engage in paid employment can be expected to 
support social policies that facilitate female labour market participation, such as 
gender equality or childcare polices (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Iversen and 
Rosenbluth 2006).  
 
A utility-maximising hypothesis would thus expect women who are involved in paid 
employment to support work and family life reconciliation policies; it would expect 
women who have chosen homemaking to support a more traditional form of family 
policy. Unfortunately our data does not allow us to distinguish between these two 
categories of women. We will thus simply hypothesise that women are more likely 
than men to support policies targeted on them. 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
Our analysis covers 22 referendums, which took place between 1985 and 2004 in the 
fields of old age pensions, labour market regulation and family policy2. These reforms 
were selected because they generally have clear distributional consequences for 
voters. In other words, it is relatively easy for voters to understand if they are likely to 
be winners or losers of these reforms.   
 
Our data comes from the VOX surveys3, which are carried out after every referendum 
vote. Respondents are asked how they voted as well as a series of socio-demographic 
and attitudinal questions. The number of respondents varies between about 800 in 
earlier surveys and about 1200 in more recent surveys.  
 
In the empirical analysis presented below, we included only the actual participants in 
the votes (on average about 55-60% of respondents) for two reasons: first, we want to 
exploit the advantage of referendum- instead of general survey-data. Therefore, it is 
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important that we include the preferences of those people, who have actually made a 
concrete choice on a particular policy. And second, reform proposals are oftentimes 
rather complex issues and non-voters are far less informed on them than actual voters 
(Di Giacomo 1993). Therefore, the analyses presented in this article include only 
respondents who actually voted. 
However, the choice to include only participants has also a downside, since turnout is 
socially structured: participation is strongly related to age, income and education 
level. Excluding people who abstained from voting reduces variation in these 
variables and may thus weaken our results. Until 1999 VOX-data also include 
information on the opinions of non-voters. Hence, where available, we have also 
made the calculations for all respondents. However, we do not report the results in the 
article, since all the effects we find are confirmed and some even strengthened. 
Consequently, our choice to present results for participants only can be viewed as a 
conservative estimate of the effects.  
  
For each vote we estimated logistic regression models where the individual voting 
decision (yes or no) is the dependent variable. Our independent variables reflect the 
cleavages we are interested in: gender, age and vertical stratification.  
 
In relation to socio-economic stratification, we were confronted with data problems. 
The only stratification-variable, which is consistently available throughout the period 
is education. The sole use of education, however, may be problematic, since education 
not only reflects material aspects of stratification, but is also one of the main 
determinants of cultural values (Kitschelt 1994), which may offset the propensity to 
vote according to material interests. After 1993, household income is also available, 
and preferable for our purposes. For this reason, in the votes prior to 1993 we use 
education as a measure of stratification, and in those after that date, income4.  
 
The inclusion of age in the models also proved problematic, because the expected 
shape of the relationship between age and support for redistribution depends on the 
precise features of the reform at stake. Support for more generous pensions may be 
linearly related to age, but approval for reductions in the age of retirement can be 
expected to be strongest among middle-aged people (40-65). In order to capture both 
linear and non-linear relationships between age and voting behaviour, we used age 
categories, rather than a continuous age variable. 
 
After careful consideration, we decided not to include the political orientation of 
respondents as a control variable in the main models. In fact, even though a variable 
on self-positioning on the left-right axis is available for several votes, its inclusion 
could have confused the analysis for several reasons. First, self-positioning on the 
left-right axis may depend on someone’s view on social policy, making it difficult to 
identify the direction of causality. Second, the left-right dimension reflects a variety 
of cleavages. Hence, one is unable to disentangle the exact meaning of a respondents’ 
self-positioning. We did nonetheless run models with left-right self-positioning as a 
robustness control, and we report the result where relevant. 
 
 
4. An empirical analysis of referendum voting on social policy issues 
The sample of referendums we analysed is rather heterogeneous, including votes in 
different policy areas. A joint analysis and discussion of all the 22 referendums is thus 
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very difficult to interpret meaningfully. It can be nonetheless pointed out that of the 
three cleavages we are interested in, age comes out as a relevant division most 
frequently (in 18 out of 22 votes), followed by vertical stratification (7 out of 22) and 
gender (3 out of 22).  
 
 
4.1. Pension policy 
During the period covered by this study, ten referendums in the field of pension policy 
took place. All concerned the basic pension scheme, which is a universal, 
redistributive social insurance scheme. Five of them were about lowering the age of 
retirement; three were about bringing more funds to the scheme; one was about 
introducing gender equality; and one was about shifting the financing of the basic 
scheme from payroll taxes to an eco-tax.  
 
Pension policy is an extremely promising field to compare the effects of different 
cleavages. In fact, we can develop clear hypotheses in relation to at least two of the 
cleavages. Regarding vertical stratification, lower income earners can be expected to 
support measures that strengthen the scheme, since they gain from its redistributive 
character. Higher income earners, in contrast, are likely to oppose such measures. 
Things are a bit more complex in relation to the age cleavage. We assume that 
measures that bring more finance to the pension scheme are going to be supported 
more strongly by older people. The relationship between age and support for 
reductions in the age of retirement, instead, can be expected to have an inverted U 
shape, meaning that the middle aged (between 40 and 64) whose aspiration to quit the 
workforce is highest should be the strongest supporters. Younger people may not find 
the prospect of a lower retirement age so essential, and older people (aged 65+) can be 
expected to oppose reductions in the age of retirement, because this essentially means 
more competitors for pension resources. Finally, we do not expect a gender cleavage 
to emerge in pension policy issues, unless the reform is specifically about gender 
related aspects such as in referendum No 9 (see Table 1). 
 
The first striking result is that age seems to be the main cleavage line in pension 
politics. In 8 votes out of 10, age is a significant predictor of voting behaviour. 
Income stratification instead, is much less likely to be a significant determinant  (3 out 
of 9 votes). As expected, gender does not generally foster conflict in pension politics. 
Even though the basic pension is strongly vertically redistributive, it today generates 
mostly generational rather than stratification-based cleavages. 
 
Insert Table 1A 
Logistic regression: Estimates for the odds of accepting pension reforms, 1998-
2000 
 
Insert Table 1B 
Logistic regression: Estimates for the odds of accepting the reforms, 1993-2001 
 
This finding is confirmed by looking at more specific aspects of the analyses. Of 
particular interest are the five votes on reductions in the age of retirement. In all cases, 
older people (65+) are far less likely than young and middle-aged people to support 
such measures, and in three out of five cases the results are statistically significant. 
Our expectation was that middle aged voters are the staunchest supporters of 
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reductions in the age of retirement. This indeed happens in the three most recent 
proposals (in one of them, the result is statistically significant). In the remaining two 
votes, middle aged people are less likely to support reductions in the age of retirement 
than younger people, but are more likely to do so than older people.  
 
Household income, as expected, is negatively related to support for a lower age of 
retirement. This is understandable, since high-income groups in Switzerland tend to 
rely on occupational and private pensions, and have less interest in a more generous 
basic pension scheme. The income effect, however, is considerably less strong than 
the age effect. It is in the expected direction in three votes, but in only one case (no 5) 
do members of a higher income category support the reform significantly less than 
people of the next lower category.  
 
If we now turn to measures designed to bring more funds to the basic pension, we find 
again a rather strong age effect. Older people (65+) are in general more likely to 
support increasing funds for pensions than other age groups. In two cases (No. 8 and 
No. 10), however, older people were less likely to support more funds. Vote No. 8 
took place at the same time as vote No. 7 and was merely a less generous alternative. 
Opposition to more funds in this case may simply have meant support for the more 
generous alternative5. Vote No. 10 was about using an ecotax to (partly) replace 
payroll taxes as a source of finance for the basic pension. Survey data shows that it 
was overwhelmingly perceived as an environmental measure rather than a way to 
bring extra finance to the pension scheme (Zürcher et al. 2002). This helps to explain 
the absence of an age cleavage.  
 
Income stratification, instead, seems less relevant for the assignment of extra funds to 
the basic pension. Again, given the strong redistributive character of the scheme, we 
would expect lower income groups to favour such measures. However, income is 
significantly related to voting behaviour on only one occasion (vote No. 6), and in the 
opposite direction.  
 
The votes on increased funding are of particular interest, because they contain both 
left-wing and right-wing solutions to the problem of financing pensions. Vote No. 6 
was about increasing VAT by one percentage point for the basic pension scheme. This 
governmental proposal was supported by all major parties. In the referendum, 
however, support for it came predominately from left-wing voters. Vote No. 7, 
instead, was about assigning to the basic pension some CHF 20 billion resulting from 
the sale of gold by the National bank, and was put forward by a right-wing party. In 
the referendum, it was mostly supported by right wing voters. What is intriguing, 
however, is that old age (65+) remains a statistically significant predictor of voting 
behaviour in both cases, even when controlling for self-positioning on the left right 
axis (models not shown).  
 
Finally, in line with our expectations, this set of votes does not show any clear 
evidence of a strong gender cleavage in pension policy issues. Vote No 9, which 
introduced gender equality, was in fact a mixed blessing for women. While 
introducing contribution credits for child rearing and contribution sharing between 
spouses, these measures were also coupled with an increase from 62 to 64 in women’s 
age of retirement. This helps to explain the absence of a significant gender cleavage. 
Vote No. 3, instead, which was about bringing back women’s age of retirement to 62, 
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was undoubtedly beneficial to women, and indeed saw a stronger prevalence of yes 
votes among female voters.  
 
The analysis of voting behaviour in pension policy issues suggests that the main 
cleavage in this field of social policy is age. Measures aimed at extending coverage to 
younger age groups are forcefully and consistently opposed by older voters (65+). In 
addition, it emerges that the prevalence of interest-based voting is very strong among 
groups defined by age, and somewhat less so among groups defined by income level.  
 
4.2. Labour market policy 
Eight reforms of labour market policy have taken place between 1985 and 2003. They 
can be easily divided into two groups according to the main aim of the proposals. 
Three votes were popular initiatives working time reductions (such as introducing a 
35 hours week) (No. 11-13) and five votes were about labour market deregulation. 
(No 14-18).  
 
With regard to age, we expect retirees to oppose social policy expansion in favour of 
working age generations. With regard to the young and the middle-aged however, 
hypotheses are more difficult to formulate. On the one hand, the middle-aged can be 
expected to be particularly favourable to working time reductions and labour market 
protection because it is harder for them to re-enter the labour market. On the other 
hand, the young are likely to be the staunchest supporters such measures, because they 
are the ones who will have to stay longer in the labour market. It is an empirical 
question, which of these two age groups will be most favourable to these bills.  
 
Hypotheses on expected income and gender cleavages are somewhat less 
straightforward, notably because unemployment protection, labour law and labour 
time regulation are not very redistributive, and generally apply to all labour market 
participants in the same way. However, the lower income groups are more vulnerable 
and should thus support workers’ protection and labour time reductions more strongly 
than higher income groups. Finally, women could tend to be more favourable to 
labour protection, since they are also more vulnerable in the labour market.  
 
Insert Table 2a  
Logistic regression: Estimates of the odds of accepting labour market reforms, 
1985-2002 
 
Insert Table 2b 
Logistic regression: Estimates for the odds of accepting labour market reforms, 
1995-2001 
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Again, the impact of age is the most consistent result with regard to working time. 
The oldest age category, retired people (65+) was consistently and highly significantly 
less likely to support working time reductions than the youngest (18-39). The impact 
of age seems to be nearly linear, since the middle aged also tended to reject the 
reduction in working time more often than the young. Part of the voting behaviour of 
the oldest generation can be explained by them being more conservative, but the 
effects remains identical when controlling for left-right self-positioning (results not 
shown).  
 
Vertical stratification, by contrast, has no consistent impact in the referendums 
dealing with the lowering of working time. Education generally accounts for only 
minor differences and in 1988 the higher educated were even more favourable to 
lowering working time than those with low and intermediate education. This effect, 
however, is not significant and remains the same when controlling for left-right self-
positioning, which might indicate that education probably captures values as much as 
material interest. Income has no significant effect on voting behaviour, which might 
be explained by the fact that working time regulation affects all labour market 
participants in the same way. It is probably for similar reasons that gender has no 
significant impact on these issues either. These results suggest that the split between 
the active and the retired generations has become the structuring conflict line in 
working time politics.  
 
The emerging picture is similar with regard to employment protection legislation. In 
four out of five votes, the oldest age group was the staunchest supporter of a reduction 
of workers’ protection or cutbacks in unemployment protection. In the 1990s and 
2000s, the retired were about two to three times more likely to support liberalization 
than the young. The impact of age is again linear, the middle-aged being somewhat 
(though mostly insignificantly) more open to labour market liberalization than the 
youngest generation. This result is robust when we control for left-right self-
positioning: in two out of four votes, the odds of the oldest generation to accept 
liberalization remain significantly lower than those of the young (results not shown). 
The only exception is the 1996 vote on labour law, when the middle-aged were even 
more favourable to the bill than the old. This vote was particularly controversial 
because it would have allowed Sunday openings for shops, a highly symbolic 
measure, whose tradition-breaking nature made it unacceptable to large sections of 
older voters.  
 
In addition, it can be observed that the more highly educated and higher income 
groups were significantly more inclined to accept retrenchment and cutbacks in labour 
protection, even though this effect weakened after 1998. Hence, there is an effect of 
vertical stratification on the preferences with regard to labour market liberalization. 
The results are robust, but weaken considerably (i.e. become insignificant) when 
controlled for left-right positioning. Finally, women – whether on the right or on the 
left – tend to be more attached to workers’ protection than men, particularly so in the 
1997 labour law reform, in which men were twice as likely as women to accept labour 
market liberalization.  
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Overall, the age cleavage is again the most important socio-structural factor 
explaining voters’ choices. The oldest age group (65+) consistently rejected working 
time reductions and was clearly more favourable to reductions in workers’ protection 
than the active generations.  
 
 
4.3. Family policy  
The sample of votes on family policy issues is more homogeneous than previous ones, 
as all four votes were about the introduction of maternity insurance (Switzerland 
lacked a mandatory maternity insurance until 2004).  
 
Most obviously, one might expect stronger support for maternity insurance by women 
compared to men. In fact, except in the event of adoption, men could not directly 
benefit from any of the four schemes proposed. At the same time, however, the impact 
of gender could be blurred by the fact that only younger women can potentially 
benefit from maternity insurance and thus be more inclined to support the introduction 
of this scheme. Controlling for age does not help here, because it does not allow us to 
distinguish between the voting behaviour of women within different age groups. For 
this reason, we also ran models using an interaction term to test the propensity of 
young women to support maternity insurance.  
 
Finally, hypotheses on the impact of vertical stratification are not straightforward, 
either. On the one hand, one could expect a strong impact, because lower income 
groups are most dependent on income replacement from maternity insurance. On the 
other hand, employment rates and hence the likelihood of relying on maternity 
insurance, are higher among highly educated women. Theoretical reasoning alone 
does not allow us to produce a clear-cut hypothesis. Hence, the issue must be settled 
empirically. 
 
Insert Table 3 
Logistic regression: Estimates of the odds of accepting the introduction of 
maternity insurance, 1984-2004 
 
 
It is most interesting to note that gender does not consistently structure the voting 
behaviour on family policy. Indeed, only in one out of four models do women support 
maternity insurance more than men. The differences between male and female votes 
are insignificant in all other referendums. To some extent, this may be due to the fact 
that people think in terms of household income. A man, living with a woman who 
interrupts employment because of maternity, will be better off if a maternity scheme 
exists.   
 
With regard to the link between age and gender, we hypothesised that young women 
would be the most favourable to maternity protection of all socio-structural groups. 
We have tested this hypothesis by introducing an interaction term in the model 
(results not shown). Young women are indeed more likely than the rest of the 
population to support maternity insurance, but in none of the cases significantly so.  
 
Age again provides more consistent results in terms of our rational utility-maximising 
assumptions. In all four referendums, age has a significant effect on the odds of 
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approval for maternity insurance. Generally, the youngest generation was two to three 
times more likely to approve the bills than the middle aged and the oldest generation 
of people (65 and older). This negative effect of age on the odds of approval holds 
stable when we control for left-right self-positioning and becomes insignificant only 
in the last referendum in 2004. Hence, the effect of age is only partly due to the more 
conservative profile of older persons. Even among ideologically like-minded persons, 
the elderly reject those policies more clearly than the young.  
 
In the 1987 vote, however, the middle aged were more sceptical against the bill than 
the oldest age category, contrary to our expectation of a linear relation between age 
and approval. This can tentatively be explained by the fact that this bill was strongly 
supported by the government, the federal parliament and all four governmental 
parties. Older voters are, in general, more likely to follow the position of the 
government and this high level of unanimity may explain the unusual approval rate 
among the oldest generation.  
 
Finally, income effects are negligible. The different income groups displayed very 
similar patterns of voting behaviour. 
 
The only interest-based effect in this field is related to age. Income and gender on the 
other hand, seem to have no effect on policy preferences with regard to maternity 
insurance. As suggested in the introduction, we may see here the limits of a rational-
choice model of voting decisions: social policy dealing with family models is, of 
course, strongly value-laden. Our data does not allow us to test value-based 
hypotheses, but our results suggest that these may help explain voting behaviour.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analysed the extent to which socio-structural characteristics, 
such as vertical stratification, age and gender, influence voting behaviour on 
redistributive social policy issues. We have started with very straightforward, 
rationalistic hypotheses, i.e. we expected a conflict line to appear if the bill proposal 
in question had diverging distributional effects for different age, gender or income 
categories.  
 
This hypothesis is most strikingly confirmed in relation to age. In 8 out of 10 votes on 
pension policy, in 7 out of 8 referendums on labour market policy and in 4 out of 4 
votes on maternity insurance, age was a relevant and significant predictor of voting 
behaviour. The direction of the age effect is almost always consistent with a rational 
utility-maximising behaviour. Even after controlling for self-positioning on the left-
right axis – elderly people being more conservative -, age remains in most cases a 
significant predictor and the direction of the effect does not change. Older generations 
not only massively approve improvements in the benefits they receive, but they also 
tend to reject social policy proposals aimed at improving the situation of the actively 
employed and of young families. The votes on labour market policies most clearly 
show the turning point at the age of retirement. People of the age of 65 and more 
significantly reject working time reductions and approve labour market deregulation, 
whereas the active generations between 18 and 64 do not differ significantly in their 
voting behaviour. The importance of the age cleavage in contemporary opinion 
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formation on social policy issues is the most important and most consistent result of 
this article. 
 
Vertical stratification, by contrast, has a relevant effect on social policy preferences 
only with regard to certain issues, most clearly so with regard to labour market 
liberalization, of which higher income-strata are more supportive than the less 
privileged.  
 
But why is utility maximising voting stronger in relation to age than in relation to 
income? One hypothesis may be that it is more straightforward to ascertain ones 
position in relation to the former than to the latter. Ideas on social mobility blur the 
estimations of costs and benefits people may make regarding the effects of social 
policy on their income and socio-structural status. In addition, the welfare state itself 
has contributed to the weakening of class-consciousness. With regard to age, by 
contrast, the calculation is easier, especially from the view of the elderly: a retired 
person will never again rely on labour market regulation, unemployment benefits or 
family policy. Hence, cost-benefit calculations are more straightforward and rational 
decision-making plays out more directly in individual decisions.  
 
 
 
6. References 
 
Armingeon, K. (2006). Reconciling competing claims of the welfare state clientele. 
The politics of post-industrial welfare states. K. Armingeon and G. Bonoli. London, 
Routledge: pp. 100-122. 
 
Baldwin, P. (1990). The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European 
Welfare State 1875-1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Berclaz, M. (2002) Les transformation de la communication politique, Geneva, 
University of Geneva, unpublished MA dissertation.  
 
Bonoli, G. (2005) "The politics of the new social policies. Providing coverage against 
new social risks in mature welfare states", Policy and Politics, 33, 3, 431-449. 
 
Bornschier, Simon (2007). The transformation of historical cleavages and the rise of 
right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Ph.D. thesis, University of Zurich, 
Switzerland. 
 
Deitch, C. (2004). „Gender and Popular Support for the Welfare State: Cross-national 
trends in a period of restructuring“, Paper prepared for the ISA RC19 annual 
conference, September 2-4, 2004, Paris, France.  
 
Di Giacomo, Fabio (1993). “La decision des abstentionnistes”, in Hanspeter Kriesi 
(ed.). Citoyenneté et démocratie directe. Zurich: Seismo. 
 
Erikson, R. and J.R. Goldthorpe (1993). The Constant Flux. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
 15 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1985). Politics against Markets. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). “Politics without Class? Postindustrial Cleavages in 
Europe and America”, in Herbert Kitschelt et al. (eds.) Continuity and Change in 
Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge University Press.  
 
Ferrera, M. (1993) EC Citizens and Social Protection, Brussels: European 
Commission. 
 
Gaxie, D. (1990). « Des points de vue sociaux. La distribution des opinions sur les 
questions sociales », in Gaxie, D., Collovald, A., Gaïti, B., Lehingue, P. and 
Poirmeur, Y. (eds). Le social transfiguré. Paris : PUF. 
 
Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2000) “The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: 
Women and Men’s Voting Behavior in Global Perspective”, International Political 
Science Review, 21, 4, 441-463. 
 
Iversen, T. and F. Rosenbluth (2006). "The political economy of gender: explaining 
cross-national variation in the gender division of labour and the gender voting gap." 
American Journal of Political Science 50(1), pp. 1-19. 
 
Kangas, O. (1995) “Interest intermediation and popular will. Comments on Peter 
Taylor-Gooby”, in S. Svallfors (ed.). In the Eye of the Beholder. Opinions on Welfare 
and Justice in Comparative Perspective, Umeä: The Bank of Sweden Trecentenary 
Foundation. 
 
Kitschelt, H. (1994). The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routeledge and Kegan. 
 
Longman, P. (1987). Born to pay: The new  politics of ageing in America. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin.  
 
Lynch, Julia (2006). Age in the Welfare State. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Manow, P. (2002). „’The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, Esping-Andersens’ 
Wohlfahrtsstaatentypologie und die konfessionellen Grundlagen des westlichen 
Wohlfahrtsstaates“, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 54, 203-
225.  
 
Oesch, Daniel (2006). Redrawing the Class Map : Stratification And Institutions in 
Britain, Germany, Sweden And Switzerland. London : Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Palier, Bruno (2003). Gouverner la sécurité sociale. Paris: PUF. 
 
Pampel, F. (1994). „Population ageing, class, context and age inequality in public 
spendin“, American Journal of Sociology, 100, 153-195. 
 16 
 
Pierson, P. (2001). The new politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Poterba, J. (1997). „Demographic structure and the political economy of public 
education“, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16, 48-66. 
 
Quadagno, J. (1989). „Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state“, 
Politics and Society, 17, 353-376. 
 
Roller, E. (2000). „Ende des sozialstaatlichen Konsenses? Zum Aufbrechen 
traditioneller und zur Entstehung neuer Konfliktstrukturen in Deutschland”, in O. 
Niedermayer, B. Westle (eds.). Demokratie und Partizipation. Wiesbaden: 
Westdeutscher Verlag.  
 
Roller, E. (2002). „Erosion des sozialstaatlichen Konsens und die Entstehung einer 
neuen Konfliktlinie in Deutschland?“, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1-11. 
 
Stephens, J. D. (1979). The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. London: 
Macmillian. 
 
Svallfors, S. (1997). "Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: a comparison 
of eight western countries." European Sociological review 13(3): pp. 283-304. 
 
Swenson, P. (2002). Capitalists against Markets. The Making of Labor Markets and 
Welfare States in the United States and Sweden. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1995) ‘Who wants the welfare state? Support for state welfare 
provision in European countries’, in S. Svallfors (ed.) In the Eye of the Beholder. 
Opinions on Welfare and Justice in Comparative Perspective, Umeä: The Bank of 
Sweden Trecentenary Foundation.  
 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (1998) ‘Commitment to the Welfare State’, in R. Jowell, J. Curtice, 
A. Park, L. Brook, K. Thomson, and L. Bryson (eds.) British and European Social 
Attitutdes. How Britain differs. The 15th Report, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Thurow. L. (1996). The Future of Capitalism. London: Nicholas Brealy Publishing.  
 
Van Kersbergen, K. (1995). Social Capitalism. A Study of Christian Democracy and 
the Welfare State. London: Routledge. 
 
Zürcher, L., Mahnig, F. and Milic, T. (2002) Analisi delle votazioni federali del 2 
dicembre 2001, Bern/Zurich, GfS/IPW, Vox No.75. 
 
 17 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: List of referendums 
 
 
 
 
No Date VOX 
No
Title                                                         
(PI = popular initiative)
Content % yes
1 June 12th, 1988 352 PI "on lowering the retirement age 
to 62/60"
Lowering of retirement age to 62 for 
men and 60 for women
35.1%
2 Nov 28th, 1993 513 Federal bill on the stabilisation of 
the social insurance schemes
Increase of the VAT by 1 percentage 
point earmarked for pensions
62.6%
3 June 25th, 1995 571 Federal law on old age insurance 
AHV (revision)
Splitting of pension contributions, 
increase of women's retirement age to 
64
60.7%
4 June 25th, 1995 572 PI "for an expansion of pension 
and disability insurance coverage"
Lowering of retirement age 27.6%
5 Sept 27th, 1998 643 PI "for the 10th revision of AHV 
without an increase in the 
retirement age"
Lowering of women's retirement age 
back to 60 (after vote No 3)
41.5%
6 Nov 26th, 2000 721 PI "for a flexibilisation of the basic 
pension scheme"
Lowering of retirement age 39.5%
7 Nov 26th, 2000 722 PI "for a flexible retirement age at 
62 for men and women"
Lowering of retirement age and ecotax 
for financing of pensions
46.0%
8 Dec 2nd, 2001 752 PI "for a stable pension scheme - 
taxing energy instead of work"
Ecotax to finance basic pensions 22.9%
9 Sept 22nd, 2002 781 PI "excess gold for pension funds" Excess gold of National Bank to be 
transferred to the basic pension scheme
47.6%
10 Sept 22nd, 2002 782 Alternative proposal to the PI 781 Excess gold of National Bank to be 
shared between a solidarity foundation, 
the  pension scheme and the cantons
46.4%
11 Mar 10th, 1985 251 PI "for longer paid holidays" Statutory right to 4 or 5 weeks of paid 
holidays (depending on age)
34.8%
12 Dec 4th, 1988 362 PI "for the lowering of working 
time"
Introduction of the 40-hours working 
week
34.3%
13 Mar 3rd, 2002 762 PI "for a shorter working week" Introduction of the 40-hours working 
week
25.4%
14 Sept 26th, 1993 505 Federal bill on measures in 
unemployment insurance
Cuts in unemployment benefits and 
extension of their duration
70.4%
15 Dec 1st, 1996 602 Federal labour law (revision) Limited opening of shops on Sundays, 
allowing women's night work, more 
flexible conditions for night work
33.0%
16 Sept 28th, 1997 622 Federal bill on unemployment 
insurance financing 
Cuts in unemployment benefits 49.2%
17 Nov 29th, 1998 654 Federal labour law (revision) Allowing women's night work, more 
flexible conditions for night work
63.5%
18 Nov 24th, 2002 792 Federal law on unemployment 
insurance (revision)
Cuts in unemployment benefits 56.1%
19 Dec 2nd, 1984 241 PI "for an effective protection of 
mothers"
Paid maternity leave 15.8%
20 Dec 6th, 1987 342 Federal law on health insurance 
(revision)
Health insurance reform with paid 
maternity leave
28.7%
21 June 13th, 1999 685 Federal law on maternity insurance 
(introduction)
Paid maternity leave for working 
mothers, birth benefits for all mothers
39.0%
22 Sept 28th, 2004 854 Federal law on the income 
replacement scheme (revision)
Paid maternity leave for working 
mothers
55.5%
22 referendums on distributional conflicts 1984-2004
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1 The Swiss constitution makes provision for various types of referendums. Constitutional change can 
be put forward by means of a ‘popular initiative’, backed by 100,000 signatures. Voters can also 
challenge at the polls any act passed by parliament, if they are able to produce 50,000 signatures to that 
effect.  
2 During the period considered, 209 national votes were held. The full list of referendums is available 
on www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/index.html 
3 Brunner, Matthias, Hanspeter Kriesi and François Lorétan. VoxIt: enquêtes post-votations 
standardisées (jeux de données informatiques). Production: SIDOS, Service Suisse d’information et 
d’archivage de données pour les sciences sociales, Neuchâtel.  See www.sidos.ch for more information. 
4 Income is operationalised by means of the following categories of monthly household earnings in 
Swiss francs: <3000, 3001-5000, 5001-7000, 7001-9000, >9001. 
5 Both referendums were about how to spend some 20 bn CHF resulting from the sale of part of the 
National bank’s gold reserves. Referendum No.7 proposed assigning the whole sum to the basic 
pension, whereas referendum No.8 was about sharing the windfall among the basic pension, a 
solidarity foundation and the cantons. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1A Logistic regression : Estimates for the odds of accepting pension reforms, 
1988-2000 
       
  Lowering of the age of retirement 
vote n°  1 2 3 4 5 
year   1988 1995 1998 2000 2000 
Sex Man r r r r r 
 Woman 0.964 1.106 1.621** 1.234 1.286 
Age 18-39 r r r r r 
 40-64 0.714 0.895 1.867** 1.145 1.124 
 65 and older 0.197*** 0.605 0.81 0.46** 0.492** 
Vertical 
stratification Income  0.825 1.069 0.9 0.822* 
 
Low level of education 
(mandatory school) r     
 
Medium level of 
education (secondary 
school) 0.793     
 
High level of education 
(tertiary school) 0.498     
(constant)   0.887 0.672 0.335*** 1.031 1.484 
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke)  0.077 0.019 0.064 0.046 0.048 
N 
observations   632 357 540 462 465 
Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to vote yes to the reform as compared to vote no or 
blank.                           *** = significant at the 0.001 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; * = significant at 
the 0.05 level; r=reference category. 
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Table 1b Logistic regression : Estimates of the odds of accepting the reforms, 1993-
2001 
         
  
More funds to basic 
pension  
Gender 
equality  Ecotax 
vote n°  6 7 8  9  10 
year   1993 2002 2002   1995   2001 
Sex Man r r r  r  r 
 Woman 0.994 1.03 1.081  0.83  1.252 
Age 18-39 r r r  r  r 
 40-64 0.989 1.591* 0.512**  0.795  0.962 
 65 and older 2.436** 2.429*** 0.774  1.981*  0.642 
Vertical 
stratification Income 1.289** 1.028 0.958  1.218*  1.207 
(constant)   0.743 0.388** 1.192   0.787   0.138*** 
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke)  0.042 0.03 0.029  0.044  0.029 
N 
observations   546 509 497   375   391 
Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to vote yes to the reform as compared to vote no or 
blank.                               *** = significant at the 0.001 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; * = 
significant at the 0.05 level; r=reference category. 
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Table 2a Logistic regression : Estimates of the odds of accepting labour market 
reforms, 1985-2002 
     
  Lowering of working time 
vote n°  11 12 13 
year   1985 1988 2002 
Sex Man r r r 
 Woman 0.841 0.933 0.694 
Age 18-39 r r r 
 40-64 0.462** 0.741 0.861 
 65 and older 0.306*** 0.451** 0.307*** 
Vertical 
stratification Income   0.994 
 
Low level of education 
(mandatory school) r r  
 
Medium level of education 
(secondary school) 0.591 1.153  
 
High level of education 
(tertiary school) 1.053 1.566  
(constant)   1.728 0.492* 0.402* 
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke)   0.07 0.034 0.05 
N observations   340 674 607 
Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to vote yes to the reform as compared to vote no or 
blank.               *** = significant at the 0.001 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; * = significant at 
the 0.05 level; r=reference category. 
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Table 2b Logistic regression : Estimates for the odds of accepting labour market 
reforms, 1995 -2001 
       
  
Labor market liberalization (reduction in 
employment protection and unemployment 
benefits) 
vote n°  14 15 16 17 18 
year   1995 1996 1997 1998 2002 
Sex Man r r r r r 
 Woman 1.329 0.992 0.567** 0.694 0.943 
Age 18-39 r r r r r 
 40-64 1.242 1.958** 1.217 1.080 1.258 
 65 and older 1.489 1.693 2.806*** 1.742* 1.995** 
Vertical 
stratification Income  1.263* 1.180* 1.174 1.072 
 
Low level of education 
(mandatory school) r     
 
Medium level of 
education (secondary 
school) 1.675     
 
High level of education 
(tertiary school) 2.248*     
(constant)   1.611 0.147*** 0.407** 0.738 0.595 
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke)  0.026 0.041 0.076 0.033 0.019 
N 
observations   509 502 521 425 473 
Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to vote yes to the reform as compared to vote no or 
blank.                                 *** = significant at the 0.001 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; * = 
significant at the 0.05 level; r=reference category. 
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Table 3 Logistic regression : Estimates of the odds of accepting the introduction of 
maternity insurance, 1984-2004 
      
  Maternity insurance 
vote n°  19 20 21 22 
year   1984 1987 1999 2004 
Sex Man r r r r 
 Woman 0.885 1.688** 0.963 0.714 
Age 18-39 r r r r 
 40-64 0.410** 0.578*** 0.411*** 0.807 
 65 and older 0.275*** 0.876 0.357*** 0.362*** 
Vertical 
stratification Income   1.014 1.027 
 
Low level of education 
(mandatory school) r r   
 
Medium level of 
education (secondary 
school) 0.503* 0.891   
 
High level of education 
(tertiary school) 1.311 3.359***   
(constant)   0.789 0.491** 1.391 3.954*** 
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke)  0.112 0.095 0.053 0.06 
N 
observations   342 617 581 531 
Figures shown are the odds ratios of the chance to vote yes to the reform as compared to vote no or 
blank.                                         *** = significant at the 0.001 level; ** = significant at the 0.01 level; * = 
significant at the 0.05 level; r=reference category. 
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